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Historical explanations are inherently comparative.  That is, they involve either an
explicit or an implicit comparison with a particular or idealized condition or train of events.  The
phrase “Second Reconstruction” is based, of course, on a recognition of this logic of
explanation, and the natural comparison is with the First Reconstruction, that beginning in the
1860s.  Perhaps because lately so many historians seem to have lost faith in the possibility of
generalization or even explanation, there have been almost no efforts to make rigorous
comparisons between the First and Second American Reconstructions by those whose discipline
would naturally lend itself to the comparative analysis of change over time.  I offer a tentative
comparison focusing on two issues: voting rights and racial discrimination in schools.
This time of a lull in the Second Redemption (the first Redemption “saved” southern
whites from the first Reconstruction) is particularly opportune for such an  enterprise.  Progress
in race relations has long since been reversed, a new ideology to justify and preserve white
supremacy – a successor to “separate but equal” with the ironic name of  “colorblindness” – has
been developed and partially institutionalized, the principal political parties have settled down
on opposite sides of nearly every issue in race relations, and a majority of the Supreme Court has
taken upon itself an even more important role in bringing about the Second Redemption than it
did in the First.  More, no doubt, is to come, as the Supreme Court has not yet indubitably
eliminated affirmative action and appears to be one judicial appointment away from declaring
Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional.  Enough has happened, however, that
trends seem clear, and the comparative absence of contemporary furor may facilitate thoughtful
consideration.
Since I have treated comparative voting rights policy extensively in the first chapter of
my 1999 book, Colorblind Injustice, I will merely summarize here what I said there.  During the
First Reconstruction, African-Americans lost political power not suddenly in the 1870s, but
gradually beginning then, not in a single burst of violence or fraud, but in a sequence of actions,
in which repeated violence and fraud, to be sure, played crucial roles, but in which laws and
state constitutional amendments were necessary and decisive.  In the First Reconstruction, as in
the Second, vote dilution through a myriad of devices – racially discriminatory gerrymandering,
the substitution of at-large for district elections, annexations and deannexations, white primaries
– went along with and facilitated disfranchisement.  It was these changes in institutional rules,
not ideological or cultural transmogrifications or extra-legal behavior, that reshaped southern
politics from the vigor of the late 19th century to the comparative torpor of the first half of the
twentieth.
A few transfigurations and many small, but extremely significant incremental changes in
institutional rules likewise characterized the Second Civil Rights Revolution, but this time the
incremental changes in voting rights policy were progressive, rather than regressive.  Until 1993,
Supreme Court decisions and amendments and stringent administration of the Voting Rights Act
by bipartisan majorities preserved and expanded minority voting rights, in contrast to the
partisan stalemate in Congress and the incremental moves toward disfranchisement by southern
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expanded after 1965, instead of gradually diminishing, as it had from the mid-1870s to the first
decade of the 20th century.  Three renewals of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and many significant
Supreme Court opinions smoothed the path.
Why the contrary trends?  The conventional answer would simply be the decline of
racism.  But we are less enlightened and our 19th century predecessors, less benighted, than we
often assume.  After all, they abolished slavery and quickly enfranchised a mass of recently-
freed and overwhelmingly illiterate slaves, writing safeguards of the vote and of equal protection
into the Constitution that would probably have been impossible to pass at any other time in
American history.  These safeguards were so strong that it took two generations of massive,
often ingenious effort to overcome them.  Today, through racially unequal enforcement of drug
and other laws, we disfranchise a substantial proportion of black males as felons, and through
haphazard administration of needlessly complicated registration laws, we disfranchise even
more of the poor, principally African-Americans and Latinos.
Instead, I suggest, the key to the contrast is that congressional districts since at least the
1950s have been drawn to make incumbents’ reelection likely, thus facilitating two necessary
conditions for the passage and progressive amendment of laws that protect minority rights: First,
members of Congress can serve long enough terms to gauge what it takes to make such
protection work, and they can then frame and fine tune laws and oversee their effective
administration.  Second, members are electorally secure enough to dare to side with minorities,
even those who generally support the other party, in return for vote swaps on other issues, or in
some instances, because of strongly-held democratic political beliefs.  In the 19th century, on the
other hand, vastly higher percentages of congressional districts were politically marginal,
members rarely served for more than two terms, and in Congress, partisanship was all-
consuming because congressmen had no time to establish working relationships across the aisle. 
In the late 19th century, political majorities in Congress were so fragile and changeable that no
civil rights bill passed both houses after 1875 (though many swept through northern state
legislatures at the time), and partisanship was so fierce that no Democratic member of Congress
ever voted for a single civil rights measure after 1865.
The morals of this part of the story are that minority rights are so fragile in a democracy
that incremental changes in institutions and institutional rules are essential to their realization,
and that minorities need institutional stability to guarantee progressive incremental change and
avoid its opposite.  Instability is the enemy of minority rights.
The much less well-known story of struggles against racial discrimination in schools in
the 19th century, one on which I have been working, between voting rights cases and other
research, for 25 years, followed a different path, though incremental change looms just as large
in its narrative.  The dominant trend in 19th century racial school reform was of slow, but
progressive change from exclusion to segregation, moving in nearly every northern state to
widespread, legally-mandated integration.  By 1901, every non-southern state with a significant
number of black children except Indiana had passed a school integration law, and even without
such a law, about half the African-American children in Indianapolis attended predominantly
white schools during the 1890s.  There were nearly 100 school racial discrimination court cases
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majority of the cases that were decided.  In none of the northern and border states that I have
studied intensively did African-Americans and their white allies rely wholly on the courts to
accomplish their objectives.  In state after state, the anti-discrimination forces coupled mass
agitation – petitions, meetings, pressure on the political parties -- with campaigns for school
board, legislative, and judicial action.  They organized around court cases, used victories or
defeats in court to press for laws and school board resolutions, and employed courts to carry out
the laws.  All of this took place with no central organization like the NAACP and no central
planning, no corps of dedicated lawyers, and nothing like adequate financial resources, and it
succeeded in substantially integrating northern “common” schools, as they were then called,
largely after the textbook end of Reconstruction in 1877, when historians have generally
believed there was a rising tide of white racism.
The contrast with the received narrative of school integration in the Second
Reconstruction is stark.  The focus of that story is largely on actions by the national government,
especially the Supreme Court and various national administrations, and on the efforts of national
organizations, chiefly the NAACP, to force and channel national governmental action.  Until the
late 1960s, it is largely a southern tale, and legislatures and school boards are forced to move not
by citizens, but by courts.  After a well-generaled campaign to attack the enemy’s capital, the
fortress falls in Brown v. Board, though loud counterattacks and guerrilla resistance persist for
nearly two decades.  Only when the war turns north does the march falter, and it is the 1990s
before retreat turns to rout.  Although many individual city or state struggles for equal schools
have their historians, the main focus has been on the Supreme Court’s major cases, from Brown
to Green v. New Kent County to Swann and Milliken v. Bradley, and finally to Jenkins I and II,
and the incremental retreat has attracted less attention than the dramatic initial victories.
The Second Reconstruction’s educational struggles have been much more complicated
and less geographically concentrated that those of the First, and perhaps no account can capture
all of their nuances.  But three contrasts that have never before, to my knowledge, been noted
ought to attract more attention and puzzlement than they have, and the chief point of my
presentation will be to point them out: In voting rights, incremental changes undid the First
Reconstruction, while they magnified the effect of Second Reconstruction, at least until 1993. 
In education, on the other hand, incremental changes brought about steadily greater equality
during the late 19th century, but progressive incrementalism was reversed around 1990 in the
Second Reconstruction.  Why were the patterns so different, and what do they say about the
convention that sees racial progress or retrogression as all of a piece, driven by attitudinal
trends?
The third contrast is in the role of the Supreme Court, and it focuses on three cases that I
have studied very intensively (Cumming, Giles, and Shaw) and one that I have not (Jenkins II). 
Cumming v. Richmond County (1899), the first case that the U.S. Supreme Court ever decided
on racial discrimination in schools, concerned the Augusta, Georgia school board’s decision to
close the only public high school for blacks in the state, while it continued to subsidize two
white high schools.  In a unanimous opinion, three years after Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice John
Marshall Harlan ruled that the Board’s action in providing manifestly unequal schools for
African-Americans could not be overruled unless the Court decided that it was motivated by
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sustained the nationally notorious disfranchising state constitution of 1901, including its
grandfather clause and the patently discriminatory actions of its registrars, on the grounds that
voting rights constituted a “political question.”  In a cynically clever taunt, Holmes remarked
that to grant Jackson Giles’s prayer to register him under what Giles claimed was an invalid state
constitution would be ineffectual: If it was unconstitutional, he could not be validly registered
under it.
As racist and reactionary at Cumming and Giles were, however, it must be noted that they
only validated the regressive actions of southern white state-sanctioned bodies.  The judicial
opinions did not themselves reverse progressive actions by states, Congress, or lower court
judges.  By contrast, in Shaw v. Reno (1993) and Missouri v. Jenkins (1995), the same five-
person majority of the Supreme Court slammed the brakes on attempts to bring about more
racial equality.  
It may be that courts -- alone, by themselves -- cannot bring about lasting, positive racial
transformation, and that in that very restrictive sense, they offer only “hollow hopes.”  But as the
formative crisis of the modern judicial system, the wild ride of the Four Horsemen that led to the
Court-packing scheme of 1937, should have taught us, courts can bring change to a halt unless
progressives successfully rally the most potent political powers.  If we ask what force, what
institution deconstructed the Second Reconstruction, therefore, there is one answer: a majority of
the U. S. Supreme Court.  
